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Tomkins, Calvin

A city subway policy

New York


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FILM SIZE: 35mm

REDUCTION RATIO: 11:1

IMAGE PLACEMENT: IA (IIA) IB IIB

DATE FILMED: 5-23-97

INITIALS: HB

TRACKING #: 21138

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THE CITY FOR THE PEOPLE.

REFORM CLUB.

42 Broadway, New York City.

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308
Z
Box 50

A CITY SUBWAY POLICY.

New York, February 17th, 1909.

To the People of New York City:

An artificial transportation crisis has been prepared by private interests and the City government; and the community is being led up to it with the expectation, that under a mistaken impression of the City's inability to help itself, new subways will be turned over to private capitalists or their construction delayed to the profit of existing roads. With the exception of the Belmont grants, subway transit is now controlled by the City. This control should be extended and not curtailed as new lines are built. Subways are the "subway streets" of the City, and should be continuously made subject to the same degree of public control as the surface streets. They should be built by the City and should not be alienated under franchise grants. Operating leases should be for short terms only, subject to the right of re-entry at the option of the City on a prearranged basis—(of indemnity if necessary). In no other way can the City hope to control its future transportation, upon which depends its successful development.

The only exceptions to this anti-franchise policy are those instances where interstate railroads seek entry into the City through

their own tunnels. The great expense attending such enterprises, combined with the necessity for exclusive permanent terminal lines, constitute a reasonable basis for long terms. The present Rapid Transit Law provides for these exceptional cases of what may be considered through transit, as distinguished from local transit, and empowers the Public Service Commission to make franchise grants of longer duration. For reasons which will be enlarged upon later, it would seem unwise to permit even a limited private exploitation of local City transit.

The relatively higher interest rate for private than for public borrowings; the necessary requirements for promotion profits and for dividends; the heavy incidence of the franchise tax; the discredit of the men who have successively conducted the City's transportation; the rapidly growing opinion in favor of effective public control, which makes investment in non-controlled corporations unsafe; the certainty of municipal competition—are all indications that private capital will not be forthcoming in sufficient amounts for transit needs, and it is as evident that the City will be obliged to finance the new lines of a comprehensive system as it is desirable that it should be so. In short, City transit should be a monopoly under City control.

The fatuity with which our officials and editors discuss nicely balanced probabilities as to the comparative promptness of petty relief—according to whether public or private construction is adopted—is incomprehensible when two points are recalled:

First, that on Referendum, our voters by overwhelming majorities ordered City subways. It is true that the late Commission broke the promise to the hope while keeping it to the ear; but its fate should warn rather than attract. If those who wish new private franchises, by which they can profit, really think the public has changed its mind, why do they not propose a new Referendum? If they do not, how can they ask the Commission, the Legislature and the Governor to serve as catspaws to draw their chestnuts from so hot a fire?

Second; what is the one consideration that our experience has shown to be all important? Is it not that our City's development has been—and will be—so rapid and so far unimagined at any given date that every private right that can be made to serve as an obstacle to the City's freedom constantly to adapt itself to

new conditions, has invariably been—and ever must be—a club to levy blackmail on the City's necessities?

In short, the first question should always be: How can the City's future be protected from franchise forestallers? How can the City be left free to do best for itself? To this there is but one answer—abstain from giving or selling for any term, however short, any part whatever of its birthright—to do with its own what it likes when it pleases. We can afford to be liberal in our contracts with those whose expectations we may disappoint; we cannot afford to barter the City's right to resume any public property or service it chooses to reassume.

Private capitalists build transportation lines only for profit and this profit depends upon congested traffic, which in turn presupposes congested living conditions. They will naturally and strenuously resist, as they are now doing, the attempts of the City to provide additional transit facilities faster than the most profitable operation warrants, and if once they gain control over the centrally located strategic lines, they will only extend these lines into the outskirts as rapidly as they find it more profitable so to do. In other words, the congestion of the City will be extended in Manhattan instead of relieved by quick and cheap transportation to the suburbs. This essential characteristic of private ownership of City transit is inseparable from such ownership and constitutes an unanswerable argument for breaking away from it. There will be no more opportune time than the present to terminate this policy, since the City is now in control of its future underground transit and through this control can subjugate the present subway, elevated and surface lines to its future requirements.

The consolidation of the several Boroughs into the great City of New York and the inception of the New Jersey tunnels marked the termination of the profitable private capitalistic stage. Communication between the different boroughs of the City and the outlying districts beyond, is now too large and vital a problem of City development to be longer entrusted to private enterprise.

In view of the rapid growth of New York, the large number of transportation routes that must of necessity be provided and their complex relations to each other, it is of the greatest import-

ance that the City should through ownership retain the command over the situation which it now enjoys. The needs of the City for many years to come are likely to be far in advance of facilities afforded, and while it is desirable that a comprehensive transit plan should be outlined by the Public Service Commission, its realization is still far off. As a consequence, and in order to take advantage of the greatest efficiency of the entire subway system of the City at any particular time, it is important that the City maintain itself in a position to compel physical connection or transfers between existing and new subway lines as they may be built. Readjustments of this character will be constantly necessary as our transport system develops concurrently with the City itself; and if the power to compel these is not retained, the City system will continue one of unrelated routes which, through lack of co-ordination of plan and service, must retard its growth.

Changes in transportation methods are so rapid that unless the City shall keep such control as shall enable it to compel the use of modernized methods, original transit rights will be transmuted into privileges to obstruct, and the City's ransom will be calculated by the full value of the plant and franchise for the remainder of its term. We note, as instances of such unfortunate obstruction, the subway station located at the Manhattan entrance of Brooklyn Bridge in such a manner as to preclude the projection of bridge traffic by subway across Manhattan. The neck of the bridge has been effectually corked in the interest of the Brooklyn Rapid Transit Railway Co. To this faulty construction the altogether unnecessary congestion which has disgraced the Manhattan terminal of this structure is mainly attributable. Again, the existing Belmont subway is in effect an East side subway downtown and a West side subway uptown, and the only intelligent explanation for such a route is that it affords exceptional opportunities to the interests in control to so extend their system on the East side uptown and the West side downtown as to enable them to demand franchises for two subways instead of one. They now control two half subways. Up to the present time this unfortunate situation has proved the most effective deterrent to further municipal construction in Manhattan. Again, the unused subway tubes at the junction of Flatbush avenue and Fulton street in Brooklyn represent a munic-

ipal expenditure of over \$2,000,000 without return, and this obstruction at that point bars the extension of the Manhattan Bridge subway except through a less desirable route and at great and unnecessary expense.

Under a private capitalistic policy the centrally located and comparatively profitable lines, which are also strategically the controlling lines, are the ones which will be exploited by private corporations, and the Public Service Commission will be forced to commit the City to undertake the development of the unprofitable outlying lines without control over their central connections, which should constitute an integral part of each one of them.

Subways will be built by private capital in any event. Its choice lies between safe investment in City bonds or speculation in transit finance stocks.

Finally, as the Rapid Transit Law has stood since 1894, its main provision for local subways has been expressly subject to Referendum, by which our people might decide whether or not they should be built by the City. The law provides that the Public Service Commission *shall* cause the question whether such railway or railways shall be constructed by the City and at the public expense, to be submitted to the vote of the qualified voters of the City within which such railway or railways are to be constructed. After the distinct popular declaration in favor of municipal subways, it will clearly be wrong for the Legislature of the State of New York to undertake to change the Rapid Transit Law without due regard for this provision, and all suggested changes in the law, from whatever source emanating, should provide for the continuance of the Referendum. In short, again to open to private capitalists the opportunity to build subway streets involves the delays incident to changing the law, changing the Governor and changing the two-to-one Referendum vote of 1894, fifteen years or more after it was taken. The instinct of the City in favor of municipal subways as distinguished from private subways, is sound and shows the appreciation of the limitations of private capital and private ends.

It is beginning to be apparent that private interests have planned: First, to delay provision for additional subways as long as possible in order to maintain the more intensive and profitable traffic. With official connivance the City's revenues

have been lavishly dissipated for purposes other than transportation and with the obvious intention of forestalling the situation by increasing the City's debt for other purposes than rapid transit to the limit permitted for all, until it is claimed that it cannot undertake its needed transportation improvements under the law as it stands. Now that the need for more transportation facilities has become too manifest and urgent to be longer resisted, it is sought to bring about radical amendments in the law itself which shall let down the bars and provide for franchise grants of longer duration, ostensibly more inviting to private capital—really for delay. In view of the popular decision for City-built subways, we do not believe private capital can be induced to build any extensive system, even under long terms, except for steam-road connections or for tactical obstruction.

Second, what is really desired are long-term "leases" of municipal subways. Such leases in reality are not leases at all, but constitute contracts more valuable than actual ownership, since they avoid the responsibilities of ownership, including taxation, and carry with them the inevitable nuisance value which accompanies all long-term municipal grants. Such is the present Belmont lease, under which the City builds the subway and leases it for seventy-five years for the City's rate of interest plus one per cent. additional. That is, taking into consideration the superior borrowing credit of the City, it is proposed that the City's untaxed subways shall be alienated for long terms at approximately the current commercial rate of interest. Subways may be leased, but not on such terms.

The formal recommendations of the Board of Estimate and Apportionment to the Charter Revision Commission, and the public statements of the Mayor and the Comptroller, indicate that official opinion in the City is committed to a policy of private in contradistinction to public control. The large expenditures of the City, incurred and proposed, for docks, lands, municipal buildings and condemnation proceedings; recovery of unprofitable ferry franchises; the continued failure to collect back real estate taxes, special franchise taxes, part of the personal taxes and assessments for benefits, and the failure for several years past to provide any commensurate appropriation for transit developments, are contributory evidences that our officials have con-

spired to place the City in a most unfortunate position as regards its transit on which all other improvements indirectly depend.

The conspiracy to deliver the City to private interests for exploitation has advanced so far that only an overwhelming public expression of opinion, such as that voiced in the Referendum of 1894, can save the situation. The adroit attempt which is being made to show that the City has arrived at or near bankruptcy and the recent dissipation of the City's revenues, together with the urgent need for transit facilities in all directions, makes the situation a peculiarly difficult one, as it was intended to be. Here is the argument as advanced by the interests which introduced the Robinson Transit Bill in the Legislature last spring:

First—The City is financially unable to build subways.

Second—The franchise periods provided for by the existing law are too short to encourage private capital to build.

Third—If it is profitable for private capital to build, it will do so, provided the law is changed.

Fourth—If it is not profitable for private capital to build, the City should not enter upon like unprofitable construction.

Conclusion—The law should be changed in the interest of private capital.

The conclusion that the City should not build if it is unprofitable for private capital to do so, and that it cannot on account of its financial condition afford to build in any event, and that consequently the door should be opened to private capitalists, is indeed specious; but it is a double-edged weapon. For in this matter the City has advantages which private capital does not enjoy. As stated, the consolidation of the outlying Boroughs into New York City and the successful demonstration of tunnel transit under the Hudson to New Jersey terminated the profitable period of private provision for public transit. The problem has now become too vast and complicated and too much involved with the social and commercial evolution of the City to be longer capable of successful treatment by private enterprise without the continuous and effective municipal control that can only be had through unfettered ownership.

The phenomenally rapid growth of the City presupposes the necessity for a similar rapid development of transit facilities, which as separate, unrelated enterprises will not all be profitable

at their inception. Long neglect has made the problem still more acute and difficult of solution.

The crisis is now here, and the City's choice lies between adopting the Governor's policy for *public* subways or the Mayor's, who closes his recent message by saying: "It seems to me that the time has now come to make such amendment to the Elsberg law as will encourage *private* capital to extend our transit facilities."

The Governor, by vetoing the Robinson bill last year, and in his message this year, has declared that he at least is of one mind with the people of the City. We quote from his message:

"The cost of new subways, the probable interest charges in case moneys for their construction were raised upon private credit, the liability of privately-owned properties and franchises to taxation, the returns naturally expected by those who would engage in such enterprises solely for purposes of profit, together with the tendency to discourage additional lines in the interest of lines already existing, make it unlikely that we should be able in any event to obtain a proper measure of relief through the construction of subways by private capital, assuming, of course, that the established rate of fare (five cents) be maintained. There may be exceptions in the cases of routes which would be regarded as aids to existing transportation lines.

"Provision for the municipal construction of rapid transit lines was decided upon by the referendum of 1894, and there is no provision for building such lines with private capital, except in the case of certain extensions of and additions to existing lines. *The policy of construction at public expense is justified because of the importance of securing a comprehensive transit development with proper regard to the needs of the City as a whole and under conditions which, though safe and advantageous for the City, might not be regarded as attractive by individuals considering an investment solely for purposes of profit.* Suitable transit lines are absolutely necessary means of intercommunication, and are as essential to the City's life as streets and bridges. The fact that they have not been considered

in the same way merely attests the tardiness of our comprehension of the needs of a developing metropolis. * * * And there would seem to be no unwisdom or prompting to extravagance in securing the measure of relief available through the adoption of the constitutional amendment with regard to the debt limit which was approved at the last session of the Legislature. This relates to the exclusion from the computation of the debt limit of such improvements as will yield to the City a net revenue in excess of maintenance, interest and amortization charges."

The City is not approaching bankruptcy in spite of the phenomenal debt-incurring policy of the present administration. In 1906, Mr. Frank A. Vanderlip, now president of the National City Bank, in an address to Savings Bank officials, stated that

"The increase of the City debt may have been rapid, but nowhere else on earth, at any time in history, can be found so great an increase in the value of property as has been recorded here in the last half a dozen years. Nowhere else is there a city growing so fast in numbers and nowhere are building activities so great or so substantial. * * * But it may be argued that there are socialistic tendencies in politics and graft in public life, and that New York City offers flourishing examples of both developments. If one granted all that and admitted that their manifestations may become tenfold what they are to-day, I believe there would still be absolute security behind the City's bond issues."

The situation has not changed since 1906, except as it has been temporarily affected by the panic of 1907, and by the very recent unusual accretion of debt.

For 1899, the first year of Greater New York, the total City taxes amounted to \$86,183,768; and for 1908 to \$116,542,896, an increase of 35.2 per cent. Though increase of population in the same period is not a correct basis of comparison, yet it is interesting to observe that the increase of population has been 35 per cent., and therefore taxes have just kept pace with population.

If the valuations of both years be brought to 100 per cent. so as to give a fair comparison, we find:

Real estate values, 1899.....	\$4,398,668,196
Real estate values, 1908.....	7,469,350,876
Increase	3,070,682,680 or 69.8 per cent.

Therefore, real estate values, difference of rate of assessment being eliminated, have grown by 69.8 per cent., while total taxes have grown 35.2 per cent.

Therefore, if total taxes had kept pace with real estate values the total taxes for 1908 would have been greater by 34.6 per cent. of the taxes of 1899, or \$29,819,583. (John Martin.)

The Port of New York consists of three urban groups contiguous to the harbor waters. East of the East River lie the Long Island cities, west of the North River lie the New Jersey cities and Staten Island, and between the two rivers, connected with the mainland to the north, lie the Manhattan, Bronx and Westchester cities. The tidal waters of the North and East Rivers have heretofore obstructed passage between the communities. Tunnels and bridges under and over the East River, and tunnels under the North River are now uniting all sections. In short, the Port is becoming an organized entity, and will hereafter develop radially instead of sporadically. Lower Manhattan is the financial and commercial centre for the surrounding districts. The prevailing passenger travel is directed to it in the morning and from it in the evening. The failure of the City of New York to provide transportation facilities in advance of actual needs has resulted in great inconvenience and has retarded the development of the four Boroughs about Manhattan, has accentuated undesirable residence congestion in that Borough, and has afforded the New Jersey factor the opportunity she has just seized, and to which additional tunnels under the North River will soon add.

The case is simple. The City of New York, owner for all time of a great area to be developed, has not been permitted to improve it. Private capital, primarily interested in promotion schemes to be profitably disposed of, has been allowed to exploit it. The City might well have improved its real estate by transit construction in advance of population. Private promoters derive

most profit by serving already densely peopled localities, and promptly realizing on the basis of immediate returns. In either case private investors furnish the funds. In the former by purchase of City bonds, in the latter by speculation in transit stocks. Up to date the policy of New York City has favored the latter to the neglect of its undeveloped area and the loss and scandals of its transit finance.

Till now the greater rivalries have been between New York localities, but from now on that of greatest and increasing importance will be between Long Island and New Jersey. In the immediate future the convergence through New Jersey of the transcontinental railroad system of the country gives that shore a decided advantage that must be met by enterprise. Unless the City of New York equalizes her transportation to the north, east and south she will lose population very rapidly to the west—that is to New Jersey. The fact that the transcontinental railway system of the United States finds its tidewater terminal on the west bank of the Hudson River and in the lower Hackensack and Passaic Valleys; the peculiar availability of these cheap valley lands for industrial purposes; the fact that no other such opportunity exists in this vicinity for connecting manufacturing sites with railways, steamships and warehouses; the proximity of the highlands lying directly back of these valleys for residential purposes; and, finally, the inexpensive opportunity for opening up the more distant part of this New Jersey territory by means of the railway systems that already exist, are all considerations which should cause that part of the Port of New York which is situated in the State of New York to take thought in advance and provide living and transportation conditions under which it can hope to retain its relative population and its consequent taxable values. In short, New Jersey's outlying districts are opened up in advance, while those of Brooklyn, Queens, The Bronx and Richmond constitute our most serious problem.

We are now brought to the final crux of the problem. The City must be provided with new transit lines. Can the City build these lines and, by so doing, keep them under its own control, or must it divest itself of control by alienating them to private capitalists? We demand an explanation as to why our officials have so persistently and exclusively neglected provision for

transportation. We charge that this is a betrayal of the public interest for the benefit of private interests. We maintain that the difficulties of the situation above referred to are purposely intensified by City officials, and are in their nature mainly artificial, and might be overcome, even by our present City government.

In short, our difficulties are directly caused by the policy of the McClellan administration, which, out of a total issue of corporate stock amounting, since January 1, 1904, to \$299,000,000, has devoted only \$19,500,000 to rapid transit, or less than seven per cent., of which but two and one-third per cent. of the whole is directly attributable to its initiative. As to the balance, in the Mayor's own words, the City "was committed prior to 1904." Note also the statement of the P. S. Commission, Jan. 15, 1909. "Within the last year the expenditure of not one dollar has been authorized by the Board of Estimate and Apportionment for the construction of new rapid transit routes." Balancing charitable judgment against common sense, there is no satisfactory explanation for this sudden and enormous expansion of the City's debt, without provision for subways—which, next to schools, health and police, constitute the vital factor in the City's development—except the deliberate purpose to forestall the situation in the interest of private capitalists.

At the instance of the Comptroller of the City, there was introduced last winter into the Legislature a constitutional amendment exempting from the debt limit revenue-producing dock and subway bonds. The Comptroller has this year opposed this measure which he promoted last year. If this constitutional amendment should now fail, it would throw the City back into her old dependence upon private exploitation. The sincerity of every official and of every citizen will of necessity be tried out by his position on this proposed constitutional change. Silence or a negative position necessarily implies consent to private exploitation. If the amendment shall be re-enacted by this Legislature, it will then be subject to popular vote in November, and, if passed, the City will immediately have available an increased debt-incurring capacity equal to the amount of subway and dock bonds outstanding, aggregating presumably one hundred and nineteen million dollars. After providing for imperative dock improvements, there will be ample margin for initial subway ex-

penditure on the basis of sectional construction and the unit price system of contracting; and this amount will be annually increased by increasing tax values.

If assessments for taxation (on which all municipal improvements are based), are to increase rapidly, this can only be accomplished by enhancement of the value of outlying property through the instrumentality of subway construction, and conversely by enhancement of the value of property at the center as a consequence of connecting it with the periphery of the City. The City Club states "that the aggregate rise in land value in Manhattan from 135th street to Spuyten Duyvil and in The Bronx, due to the building of the present subway, was \$80,500,000, while the entire cost of the subway was \$43,000,000."

Increase of tax values make more subways possible, and the inception of each new subway increases the debt limit. It is poor economy to tie the City's hands by prohibiting the use of its assets. Transit to New Jersey, which is dependent upon private enterprise, should be encouraged, and so should transit to New York suburbs, which is dependent upon public enterprise.

Remedial measures of secondary importance are also available. First, the equalization of assessments. While assessments for taxation approach full value in the older parts of the City, there is no question but what assessments may be advantageously raised in most if not all of the outlying boroughs. The Low administration resorted to this procedure, and it should now in fairness be availed of again.

A more vigorous policy should be pursued for the collection of real estate taxes, special franchise taxes, personal property taxes and the collection of local assessments for benefits, which, according to the last report of Mr. Nelson P. Lewis, Chief Engineer of the Board of Estimate and Apportionment, now average three years past due.

An improved system of condemnation of property such as has been suggested by the Comptroller and the President of the Commission of Taxes and Assessments would result in a very large saving to the City.

The procedure known as Excess Condemnation, which permits the City more fully to take advantage of the betterment it creates, will effect large savings in the budget. In no other

way can expensive reorganizations in the older settled parts of the City be accomplished with reasonable expense. This procedure is generally availed of in Europe and has been resorted to in the Bronx. By enabling legislation its use should be made generally applicable.

The application of an eight-hour law to City employees and a reduction in their unnecessary number, and provision for a department for purchasing supplies, as recommended by the Bureau of Municipal Research, will tend to effect substantial economies.

A thorough-going revision in the present slovenly system of municipal accounting will, by placing responsibility upon officials, possibly accomplish more than any other one reform in safeguarding and husbanding the resources of the City. Aside from a few experts, there are few people in the City who understand the condition of municipal finances—instance the difficulties of ascertaining the debt limit. This protracted disorganization of the Comptroller's department, extending through many administrations, has probably contributed more to municipal dishonesty and incompetence by hiding responsibility than has any other one cause.

It is not necessary to contract for and build all of the Fourth Avenue Brooklyn line as a single enterprise, at the present time. This might now be too great a strain upon the slender revenues of the City and would unfairly prejudice the development of other sections. But construction should be promptly begun and simultaneously continued in each year along the routes indicated on the within map. These routes constitute the central part of the municipal system with its projections in the direction of South Brooklyn, Staten Island by tunnel, East New York and The Bronx. They will conduct traffic to and from lower Manhattan, and will be profitable at least as far as the outlying, sparsely settled districts. Extensions into these districts should be made slowly as the revenues of the City warrant, and no one district should be favored at the expense of the others. The plan provides for the continuation of the present Belmont subway to Flatbush, and contemplates the ultimate acquisition by the City of the Steinway Tunnel on some reasonable basis.

If the City were in control of the situation, the evident solution of the Steinway Tunnel and Manhattan-Bronx problem

would be to continue the lower East Side subway from Forty-second street north into The Bronx and the upper West Side subway from Forty-second street south to the Battery, disconnecting the Forty-second street section of the subway from its north and south connections, continuing it toward the Hudson and New Jersey and connecting it with the Steinway Tunnel. The river tunnel is now only available for trolleys. If extended it would be available for trains. The terms on which the City can afford to take over the Steinway Tunnel and make it a part of its bridge and tunnel system and thus release its holders from their unfortunate position, should necessarily include the rectification of the "mistakes" of design permitted at the inception of the existing Manhattan subway system. The plan also suggests the importance of promptly beginning the construction of a tunnel paralleling the Brooklyn Bridge between Manhattan and Brooklyn, which shall connect the Manhattan with the Brooklyn loop. Traffic conditions have been temporarily relieved at the Brooklyn Bridge, but with the growth of traffic they will soon again become acute, and no permanent relief can be expected except through the instrumentality of such a river tunnel.

It goes without saying that Manhattan routes leading to New Jersey should be subjected to the same degree of Municipal control as New York lines.

The pitiful expenditure for subway construction during the last few years, in glaring contrast to the lavish expenditure for other municipal betterments, however meritorious, should be corrected, and a parity in urgent expenditures established.

A comprehensive transit plan should be provided and published by the Public Service Commission. Engrossment in other urgent matters may serve our Public Service Commissioners as an excuse for postponing this; but they cannot avert the consequences of delay. Has the Commission a general plan in relation to which it is studying what items first to progress, so that it can promptly reject or hold for consideration such projects as are presented to it? If so, why is the public not taken into its confidence. If not, how will its fate differ from that of its predecessors, who—after giving the first Belmont franchise, which forestalled East and West Manhattan lines and obstructed Brooklyn traffic, and then the second, with the Flatbush avenue obstruction

to extort ransom from the City—subsequently laid out for Belmont and Ryan all the routes either wanted till it drove them to consolidate instead of to build. Is the proposed McAdoo extension of its Sixth avenue line to the Grand Central Station in conformity with such a comprehensive plan, which shall conserve the maximum subway capacity of the streets between the Pennsylvania and Grand Central Stations and so obviate future complications in that district of dense traffic? Let the future policy of the City once be definitely determined and private corporations will find it necessary to conform their policy to that of the City, thus avoiding needless complications, obstructions and delays.

The cost of extending the central subway system may be lessened in some instances by suburban elevated construction. Provision should be made for sectional construction of and the unit price system of contracting for subways so they may be begun and extended as the financial resources of the City warrant in each year. By these means, expenditures in any one year would not weigh unduly on the City's revenues or its debt-incurring capacity. The United States Government follows this policy, railroads and other corporations do the same and there is no reason why the City should be constrained by legislation to follow a different policy. Sectional construction means the construction of a subway by advancing one or more sections at a time. The unit price system of contract means contracts based on unit quantities—so much per cubic yard for earth excavation, rock excavation, concrete and stone work, so much per pound for the supply and erection of iron work, etc., a contractor's bonus being added in case the work should be temporarily discontinued. Freedom to resort to these established methods would greatly facilitate municipal subway construction under existing financial conditions.

The practice of street opening procedure should be so extended as to include subway as well as surface streets and the co-ordinate principle of assessment for betterments upon property benefited by subway construction should be availed of. In some instances, notably in Queens, it is possible that this procedure, if provided, might be utilized by general acquiescence in order to promptly obtain transit facilities for real estate development.

The changes in the transit law proposed by the Public Service Commission, if desirable, should be brought about by the introduction of separate bills exempting specific and exceptional cases from the general provisions of the Rapid Transit Act. This will not endanger the salutary provisions of the law, will limit the responsibility of the Commission and will compel each separate case to stand on its own merits.

It is evident that both the New York Central and the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroads must obtain better access to lower Manhattan. In the case of the New York Central Railroad, connection could be made with its tracks—and additional tracks—at Sixtieth street by an elevated railroad system of from two to eight tracks along the marginal street of the City on the West Side. This would necessitate the opening of the street from Thirty-eighth street north. The construction of such an elevated railroad would be attended with comparatively slight expense and with little or no damage to abutting property. In no other way can ample West Side transit facilities to the north be arranged for so cheaply and effectively as by resort to this plan. Such a road, however, should be constructed by the City under a favorable operating contract with the New York Central. It should especially provide for low fares within the City limits in contradistinction to the folly of the Pennsylvania Railroad contract which especially provides that that corporation shall carry no local passengers within City limits. It should also be considered in relation to the removal of the surface tracks from Tenth and Eleventh avenues.

The New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad on the East Side must find some means for conducting the traffic of its numerous tracks into Manhattan. This can be accomplished by subway construction under the provisions of the existing Rapid Transit Act, section 32a, etc., which delegate ample contractual powers to the Public Service Commission to deal with the railroad company on the basis of a long-term franchise. Possibly the Lexington avenue-Broadway route might be used jointly by the McAdoo and New Haven systems.

A plan providing for freight terminal facilities and for the transmission of commodities, as well as passengers, within the City limits is also urgently needed, and an attempt at the solution

of this intricate and perplexing problem should be made by the Public Service Commission. Without it our commerce will tend to drift to the New Jersey district of the Port.

The power of the expansion of New York City is irresistible, and any "vested" interest which counters it will inevitably be destroyed. Private control of local transit has served its purpose and its day. It can no longer cope with the magnitude and difficulties of the problem. The City alone, through its instrumentalities of public opinion, organizing and unifying power and financial credit, is competent to meet the new responsibility. As a consequence of the influence which private capitalists interested in local transportation still exercise over our streets, politics, press, finance and bench, they are yet able to seriously delay needed provision for City transit in the hope of bringing back the conditions of the older system. The impossibility of so doing, however, becomes apparent when the magnitude of, and the insistent demand for, additional transit are realized.

If the law is broken through and these men secure franchises for one or more new routes they will promptly be importuned to build others in competition with them. If they fail to do this the City will build and compete, and so each added private line becomes a hostage to the City for the construction of additional lines by private capital. It will be unprofitable to privately provide these in competition with those which already exist, and then the City will do so. There can, in fact, be no limit to the insatiable demands of the City for transit except the capacity of the City treasury to provide it at cost—or less.

If the existing system of private lines shall not become coordinated with the new municipal system and divide with the City at least a part of the responsibility for their profitable conduct—the City itself will inevitably be forced into a policy of direct competition with them for the express purpose of minimizing the value of these lines preparatory to expropriating them, for they cannot be permitted to exist as permanent obstructions in the streets. Such a policy will mean exasperating delays and inconvenience for the City and disaster for the private interests involved. It is to be hoped that the essential principles of the existing law will not be changed—that wiser counsels may prevail, and that on some basis of mutual advantage the existing

private system of transportation may be gradually merged into a general municipal system. Private interests have much more to gain than has even the City itself from such a conciliatory policy, since the result is a foregone conclusion, and the City has the power, knowledge and spirit to command the situation.

In conclusion we reiterate the statement that *subways are the "subway streets" of the City, and should be continuously made subject to the same degree of public control as the surface streets. They should be built by the City and should not be alienated under franchise grants. Operating leases should be for short terms only, subject to the right of re-entry at the option of the City on a prearranged basis—(of indemnity if necessary).*

The exploitation of the needs of the City is the curse of the City, and advances in municipal civilization depend primarily upon preventing the unfair use of the many by the few.

CALVIN TOMKINS,
Chairman.




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PM-MGP METRIC GENERAL PURPOSE TARGET PHOTOGRAPHIC



PRECISIONSM RESOLUTION TARGETS



A&P International
 2715 Upper Alton Road, St. Paul, MN 55119-4760
 612/778-3029 FAX 612/778-1686


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

PROPOSED BY REFORM CLUB

IMMEDIATE CONSTRUCTION NOTED IN HEAVY LINES
SUBSEQUENT EXTENSIONS IN BROKEN LINES.






**REDUCTION
RATIO
11:1**

PM-MGP METRIC GENERAL PURPOSE TARGET PHOTOGRAPHIC



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

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



PRECISIONSM RESOLUTION TARGETS



A&P International
2715 Upper Alton Road, St. Paul, MN 55119-4760
612/738-9329 FAX 612/738-1496

A4




CENTRAL SUBWAY CONSTRUCTION

PROPOSED BY REFORM CLUB.

IMMEDIATE CONSTRUCTION NOTED IN HEAVY LINE.

SUBSEQUENT EXTENSIONS IN BROKEN LINES.




CENTRAL SUBWAY CONSTRUCTION

PROPOSED BY **REFORM CLUB**

IMMEDIATE CONSTRUCTION NOTED IN HEAVY LINES

SUBSEQUENT EXTENSIONS IN BROKEN LINES.



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**END OF
TITLE**